Several days have passed since the conclusion of the tenth-term elections for the Shura Council in Oman, where electronic voting was fully implemented both domestically and internationally through the Intakheb application. This innovative approach garnered praise from many and sparked discussions about its influence on the overall electoral process.
However, the question of what precisely the voters were casting their ballots for appears to be of minimal interest to observers, particularly those outside of Oman. Amidst the focus on livelihoods, the call for political reforms may not be at the forefront of many minds.
Powers of Shura Council
The Shura Council, an advisory body with elected members, functions in limited capacities, primarily confined to consultative roles. It forms the second chamber of Oman’s Council, beneath the State Council, which is appointed by the Sultan and shares similar responsibilities to the Shura.
Talib Al-Maamari, a former Shura Council member and professor at Sohar University, highlights that Decree (No. 7/2021 on the Oman Council Law) delineated the Council’s oversight from its legislative functions, allocating oversight to the state’s supervisory bodies. Consequently, the Shura Council’s current mandate focuses on legislative activities, such as proposing, amending, or ratifying laws introduced by the government.
This shift has significantly curtailed the Shura Council’s ability to scrutinize government actions and utilize parliamentary mechanisms effectively, like evaluating government performance, questioning, seeking the removal of law-violating ministers, or advocating for governmental reshuffles. Al-Maamari characterizes the council’s status as merely a legislative endorsement body or an advisory council devoid of any real power to oversee, critique, or alter government actions.
It’s important to highlight that the Shura Council’s “adoption of laws” merely signifies approval, as the Sultan is ultimately responsible for the adoption and ratification of laws.
Ishaq Al-Aghbari, a key figure in the 2011 movement, suggests that despite its inception in 1991, the Shura Council requires significant reform to align with the Omani populace’s expectations and societal elites’ ambitions. Although the Council has seen developmental progress and constitutional enhancements in its authority, it still confronts notable obstacles.
Al-Aghbari outlines these challenges to Muwatin: Firstly, the Council’s limited authority renders its decisions as mere advisory suggestions, diminishing its tangible influence on policy and governance oversight. Secondly, transparency issues obstruct public and organizational access to governmental data, complicating efforts to assess the Council’s effectiveness. Lastly, the Council’s constrained capabilities and operational difficulties contribute to a perception among some citizens of its negligible impact on daily life and national decision-making processes.
A Council without Powers
A review of the Omani Shura Council’s history reveals a significant reluctance to endow the council with autonomy, beginning with its formation process, which evolved from appointments to indirect elections limiting voter eligibility to specific groups. This process gradually expanded until it transitioned to a direct general election for all eligible voters in 2003, thirteen years after the council’s establishment.
The Council’s powers have also undergone several changes, with the latest being the 2021 Oman Council Law, stripping the Shura Council of any substantial oversight functions, which were already limited. Talib Al-Maamari, a former member of the Omani Shura Council, comments, “In this new electoral term, the council’s function has been narrowed down to legislative duties, which are far from absolute.” He elaborates that even if the Shura Council unanimously passes a proposed law, it cannot be enacted without the Sultan’s approval. Moreover, the government can sideline it if deemed necessary. Thus, the legislative power of the council is inherently restricted, as neither the Council of Oman, encompassing both the State Council and the Shura Council, can enact laws independently without a royal decree to formalize the legislation.
This shift has significantly curtailed the Shura Council's ability to scrutinize government actions and utilize parliamentary mechanisms effectively
The issue is not merely about requiring the Sultan’s endorsement for laws to become effective; this is a common feature in many democratic systems where legislation does not take effect until ratified by the head of state. However, if there is a disagreement between the president and the House of Representatives, democratic systems typically have constitutional mechanisms in place to either dissolve the legislative body or enact the law through other means. For example, in the Egyptian Constitution, Article 123 stipulates: “The President of the Republic has the right to issue laws or veto them. If the President vetoes a bill passed by the House of Representatives, it must be returned within thirty days. Should it not be returned within this period, it automatically becomes law. If returned within the stipulated time and the House reaffirms it with a two-thirds majority, it again becomes law.” Furthermore, the constitution delineates circumstances under which the President may dissolve the House of Representatives and mandate elections for a new assembly, such as when a Prime Minister fails to win the House’s confidence a second time.
According to Article 107 of the Kuwaiti Constitution, the Emir possesses the authority to dissolve the National Assembly through a decree, providing clear reasons for such dissolution. However, the Assembly cannot be dissolved for the same reasons again. Should dissolution occur, elections for a new Assembly must occur within two months from the date of dissolution. Failure to hold elections within this timeframe results in the dissolved council regaining its complete constitutional authority. It reconvenes promptly and continues with its duties as if dissolution had never occurred, continuing until the new council is elected.
In accordance with the Law of the Council of Oman, the Sultan holds the authority to reject laws forwarded by the Council of Oman simply by not providing any stipulations following the submission of laws. This action effectively concludes the role of the Council at that juncture. Concerning the dissolution of the Council, the law specifies that the Sultan may dissolve the Shura Council and initiate new elections within four months from the dissolution date, as deemed appropriate in certain circumstances.
In matters concerning parliamentary councils’ powers, such as granting and withdrawing confidence from the government or ministers, distinctions can be observed between the Kuwaiti Constitution and the Oman Council Law. In Kuwait, withdrawing confidence from the Prime Minister is not permitted, but the Council retains the authority to withdraw confidence from individual ministers. Conversely, in Oman, neither the Council as a whole nor the elected Shura Council possesses the right to withdraw confidence from any minister, let alone the government itself, as outlined in the Oman Council Law.
In governmental oversight, the legal framework governing the interrogation of ministers comprises seven articles delineating the procedural intricacies. According to these provisions, at least 15 members must jointly submit an interrogation request. The request is nullified if any member withdraws support unless a substitute member is promptly designated. Interrogations are confined to service ministers. Before submission to the government, the interrogation request undergoes scrutiny by the Council Bureau and subsequently necessitates majority approval within the Council. Furthermore, interrogation sessions are held in strict confidentiality. Following the session, the Council forwards recommendations to the Sultan, contingent upon garnering two-thirds of the support from Council members.
The observation drawn from the preceding discussion is that the Omani Shura Council lacks even the fundamental powers typically afforded to parliamentary councils. The interrogation process, characterized by stringent procedural requirements, demands substantial time and effort from its members, culminating in a brief discussion facilitated by a single representative representing the interrogating parties. By contrast, the Egyptian constitution addresses the interrogation process in two articles. The first, Article No. (130), delineates:
In accordance with the Law of the Council of Oman, the Sultan holds the authority to reject laws forwarded by the Council of Oman simply by not providing any stipulations following the submission of laws.
“Every member of the House of Representatives may direct an interrogation to the Prime Minister, or one of his deputies, or one of the Ministers, or their deputies, to hold them accountable for matters falling within their jurisdiction. The Council shall discuss the interrogation after at least seven days from the date of its submission, and a maximum of sixty days, except in cases of urgency that he deems necessary, and after the government’s approval.” Article 131 grants ten members of the House of Representatives the authority to submit a request for the withdrawal of confidence from either the Prime Minister or Ministers. This action is permissible subsequent to the interrogation request and within the same session, requiring a majority vote of those present. Conversely, Article 101 of the Kuwaiti Constitution delineates the House of Representatives prerogative to revoke confidence from any minister post-interrogation session, subject to a majority vote of those present. Regarding the Prime Minister, Article 102 explicitly prohibits casting a vote of no confidence in them. However, if the National Assembly deems communication with the Prime Minister untenable, the matter is referred to the Emir. The Emir may then dismiss the Prime Minister or dissolve the Assembly. In the event of a new Assembly, if the request to dismiss the Prime Minister is submitted to the Emir, the Prime Minister is dismissed accordingly.
The approval of the state’s general budget is one of the paramount powers vested in parliamentary councils. Constitutions in Egypt and Kuwait expressly confer this authority upon their respective councils, alongside other prerogatives pertaining to public expenditure oversight. Conversely, the law governing the State Council in Oman delineates a narrower scope of authority for the Council of Oman – encompassing both the State Council and the Shura Council. Here, their powers are primarily limited to discussions and recommendations. Notably, the government retains the discretion to disregard these recommendations, albeit obligated to provide reasons for doing so in accordance with Article 52. Moreover, confidentiality is mandated for these sessions. In contrast to the constitutions of Egypt and Kuwait, they do not specify the confidentiality of sessions for discussing and approving the general budget. However, what tools does the Council employ to fulfill its objectives?
Article (56) of the 2021 Council of Oman Law, titled “Follow-up Tools Established for the Shura Council,” delineates the following:
“The Shura Council may exercise its follow-up jurisdiction by using the following tools: urgent statement, request for briefing, expression of interest, question, discussion requests, discussion of ministerial statements, and interrogation.” The analysis of the interrogation’s nature is conducted in alignment with the law of the Council of Oman, indicating that the remaining tools, which hold a lower rank, do not necessarily express substantial authority.
Comparing the royal decrees issued during the reign of the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said with those of his successor regarding the Council of Oman reveals a notable reduction in the limited autonomy previously granted to the Shura Council. A prime example of this is the annulment of Article No. (107) of Decree No. (88) of 1997, which stipulated:
“The Council manages its finances independently and is not subject to oversight by any external entity. However, the Council President may enlist the aid of the General Secretariat for State Financial Supervision to compile a report on the Council’s financial matters, including budget implementation and other financial affairs.” Contrastingly, Article No. (4) of Decree (7) of 2021 states:
“The laws and royal decrees governing the state’s administrative units shall equally apply to both the State Council and the Shura Council. This includes organizational structure, financial and administrative oversight, employee regulations, pension schemes, and the preparation of annual budgets and final accounts for the Council.”
The Essential for Political Reform
Oman differs significantly from other Gulf countries due to its unique circumstances. Unlike Saudi Arabia, it lacks the financial resources to uphold a social contract rooted in the ruling family’s power monopoly, exchanging it for comprehensive state paternalism. The International Monetary Fund’s assessment of Omani reforms highlights a reduction in government debt to 40% of GDP, with cash reserves totaling approximately $17.6 billion. Overall, the report suggests that Oman’s path to fiscal sustainability will entail bolstering the private sector, enhancing tax collection efficiency, fostering labor market flexibility, and pursuing economic measures that diverge from the paternalistic model, given Oman’s distinct position and limitations.
Another critical aspect of reforms is combating corruption. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index report for 2022, Oman’s ranking declined, receiving a score of 44 and ranking 69th out of 180 countries. Furthermore, Oman faces an unemployment crisis, estimated at 2.3% for 2023, exacerbating previous protests. The country also scored 24/100 points in the 2023 World Freedom Index by Freedom House, with 6/40 for political rights and 18/60 for civil liberties, categorizing it as “lacking freedom.”
Given the absolute concentration of power in the hands of the Sultan, any social movement arising from economic challenges, as witnessed in the protests of 2011, 2018, and 2019, is perceived as a direct challenge to his authority. The violent reactions of security forces further reinforce this interpretation. Moreover, consolidating power in the Sultan’s hands entails the appointment of senior officials to manage government affairs. In contrast, political reforms advocate for the appointment and accountability of these officials by an elected parliament, enabling public participation in decision-making. Such participation provides a channel for expressing popular sentiments regarding government performance through elections and the separation of powers, fostering political stability. Additionally, administrative efficiency is enhanced when officials are overseen by an elected body empowered to hold them accountable rather than by a supervisory body aligned with the appointing authority.
an active legislative oversight council, equipped with all parliamentary tools, serves as a crucial safety mechanism for society. It deters administrative laxity, prevents the exploitation of positions for personal gain.
Former Omani Shura Council member Talib Al-Maamari emphasizes the significant benefits of having a genuine parliament. He underscores that parliamentary bodies worldwide play a crucial role in supporting governments by representing the populace, being elected by them, and being cognizant of their issues and needs. This proximity to the people facilitates the enactment of laws that streamline governmental operations and maximize benefits for citizens. Al-Maamari further suggests that the state can diversify its administrative governance tools by empowering the Shura Council as a legislative oversight body. This approach provides invaluable insights from an independent perspective, allowing for the identification of performance deficiencies, continual administrative system improvement, error avoidance, weakness mitigation, and corruption detection if present.
He elaborated to Muwatin that an active legislative oversight council, equipped with all parliamentary tools, serves as a crucial safety mechanism for society. It deters administrative laxity, prevents the exploitation of positions for personal gain, and safeguards national interests from disruption. With executive management subject to continuous supervision and accountability, errors are minimized, and efforts to prevent defects, corruption, and negligence are heightened.
Furthermore, the former Shura Council member highlights additional benefits. He emphasizes the state’s need for internal support when making critical decisions, especially when interests overlap and relationships are complex. These circumstances can lead to diplomatic tensions with other nations due to governments making unilateral decisions. In his view, decisions made by elected parliaments alleviate pressure on governments and provide them with the strength to confront challenges with widespread popular backing.
Al-Aghbari asserts that to realize these benefits, several prerequisites must be fulfilled. These include enhancing the Council’s mandate in shaping and monitoring governmental policies and financial oversight, attaining a constitutional equilibrium favoring the Council’s upholding of the separation of powers, abstaining from meddling in governmental affairs and fostering fundamental freedoms like freedom of expression, assembly, and press. Fostering community engagement and collaboration between the Council and citizens is vital.
A Potential Reform
To enact feasible reforms accepted by Omani authorities, demands must be pragmatic. This was evident in past protests, yet governmental response fell short of expectations. Political scientist and international relations researcher Alawi al-Mashhour suggests a viable solution dubbed the “First Minister” proposal. This entails a parliament empowered to form the government, alongside the allowance of political associations with varied visions to participate in elections and propose governmental programs. The largest parliamentary bloc or coalition would then select the First Minister, heading the government, with ministries divided into sovereign and service portfolios.
Furthermore, the Prime Minister has the authority to appoint and hold portfolio holders accountable in parliament, including ministries in economy, finance, education, health, tourism, agriculture, and industry. The second category comprises sovereign ministries, encompassing defense, security, foreign affairs, and the Diwan, appointed exclusively by the Sultan without parliamentary oversight. Alawi Al-Mashhour stresses the necessity of fostering political pluralism, permitting the formation of political associations or lists to contest parliamentary elections and vie for the Prime Minister’s government formation.
He anticipates that realizing this idea would mark a milestone in political life in Oman and the wider region, presenting a novel experiment fostering political engagement, freedoms, and societal participation. “Politics is the art of the possible, and it’s challenging to raise expectations beyond the realities on the ground,” he told Muwatin. He emphasizes that any parliament failing to shape and influence events through the executive branch is rendered meaningless.
Achieving this necessitates amending the State's Basic Law to mandate the implementation of Shura Council decisions. Without this amendment, the Council would lack genuine authority.
This proposal bears a resemblance to the political landscape in the Kingdom of Morocco, which shares similarities with Oman in terms of hereditary rule by a noble family, albeit with notable distinctions. Morocco has seen an active political life, particularly following the 2011 protests, prompting the King to enact significant constitutional reforms, granting the right to form the government to the leader of the largest bloc in the House of Representatives.
Article 47 of the Constitution stipulates: “The King appoints the Head of the government from the political party that secured the most seats in the House of Representatives elections, based on their outcomes. He appoints government members upon the Head’s recommendation. The King may, at his discretion and after consulting the head of the government, dismiss one or more government members from their positions. Similarly, the Head of the government may request the King to dismiss one or more government members.” This expansive language grants the King the authority to appoint ministers for sovereign ministries, a common practice in Morocco.
The Egyptian constitution provides clarity regarding sovereign ministries. Article 146 specifies, “The President of the Republic, in consultation with the Prime Minister, shall select the ministers of defense, interior, foreign affairs, and justice.”
Journalist and activist Ishaq al-Aghbari contends that the Omani situation necessitates an independent and comprehensive study to determine if a political party system is essential for achieving democracy. He underscores the importance of developing a fair electoral system to ensure a balanced representation across society, promoting accountability and transparency in both government and parliament, and offering support to non-governmental organizations and independent media outlets.
In proposed reforms, former Shura Council member Taleb al-Maamari advocates reactivating the Shura Council’s oversight capabilities. This would enable it to carry out its civic duties as a genuine institution effectively, monitoring government performance, critiquing shortcomings, and holding accountable those who fail or violate the law. Key oversight tools include questioning government members, the authority to make decisions concerning them, and the obligation to enforce voted decisions.
However, Al-Maamari asserts that achieving this necessitates amending the State’s Basic Law to mandate the implementation of Shura Council decisions. Without this amendment, the Council would lack genuine authority to assist the government in implementing administrative governance and fighting corruption and lawlessness within the executive branch.
