Despite the secrecy surrounding the status of Shia Muslims in the Gulf, various incidents reveal differing degrees of human rights violations against them by the ruling regimes in these countries. These include stripping of citizenship, denial of civil rights, and court trials deemed unjust by international human rights organizations. Other forms of discrimination and persecution also occur against this religious group, even in countries where they constitute a majority, such as Bahrain.
On the Situation of Shia Muslims in the Gulf
Estimates suggest that the global Shia population is between 150 and 200 million, making up only 10-13% of the world’s Muslim population. Approximately three-quarters of this number reside in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and the Gulf states. Shia Muslims constitute between 65% and 70% of Bahrain’s population, 15% to 25% in Saudi Arabia, 10% to 15% in Kuwait, and 5% to 10% in the United Arab Emirates. In Oman, they form a smaller, wealthier minority, estimated at 3% to 7%, while there are no definitive figures for Qatar, though estimates suggest they make up around 10% of the population.
Various reports have documented the persecution and exclusion faced by Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia. Human Rights Watch has reported numerous violations and repressive practices in the Kingdom. A briefing on religious freedom and human rights highlighted discriminatory practices, exclusion from public office, restrictions on religious practices, and curbs on political and civil liberties, with large numbers being imprisoned. Another Human Rights Watch report condemned the arbitrary measures and hate speech directed at Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia, stating that the Kingdom’s reforms do not include tolerance for the Shia community. Most Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia live in the oil-rich Eastern Province, particularly in Qatif and Al-Ahsa.
A briefing on religious freedom revealed that the Shia majority in Bahrain faces systematic persecution, including harassment of religious leaders and imprisonment of government critics. The report also highlighted discrimination in employment, particularly within the security forces, and several barriers to equal participation in society and governance.
Bahraini human rights activist Sayed Yousif Al-Muhafda stated, “Shia Muslims are barred from working in certain government sectors, and public positions are allocated based on loyalty and sect, reflecting a lack of trust between Shia citizens and the ruling authorities.” He provided examples of religious restrictions, such as revocation of citizenship, forced deportation of Shia religious figures, travel bans, and the arrest of dozens of Shia clerics. Other measures include bans on prayer and mass arrests during Ashura commemorations.
In Kuwait, the Shia minority can practice their religion without government interference, provided they do not disturb neighbors or violate laws on gatherings and proselytizing. However, there are restrictions on repairing existing Shia mosques or building new ones, and Shia Muslims rarely reach leadership positions. In Oman, the situation for Shia Muslims appears more favorable; they enjoy political and economic influence, possibly due to Oman’s better relations with Iran compared to other Gulf states.
Al-Muhafda further commented, "Bahrain prides itself on being a state that tolerates minorities, which we as human rights activists commend and support. But the question remains: What about the majority? Why does the king not show tolerance towards the Shia majority and protect their rights and religious freedoms?"
While the situation of Shia Muslims in Qatar is somewhat opaque, there are reports of religious violations against them, particularly regarding the freedom to practice their rituals. Shia citizens in Qatar are also excluded from senior positions in the state. Even though the UAE is considered the Gulf country most open to religious freedom, it has faced accusations of discrimination against Shia Muslims. Human Rights Watch accused the UAE of forcibly disappearing at least four Pakistani Shia and deporting at least six others due to their sectarian identity.
On Citizenship Status in the Gulf
Reports from human rights organizations and research studies suggest that many Shia citizens in their countries are viewed with suspicion and doubt. Authorities often question their loyalty to the nation, relegating them to second-class citizenship, denying them fundamental rights, and excluding them from high-ranking positions.
Regarding this, Dr. Abdullah Alaoudh told Muwatin, “Shia Muslims in the Gulf, particularly in Saudi Arabia, face significant challenges. In general, everyone suffers, but Shia Muslims, being a religious minority, face even greater hardships.” He attributes this to the lack of citizenship standards, which stem from treating citizens in the past based on a political deal involving granting privileges in exchange for absolute loyalty.
Dr. Abdullah Alaoudh points out that the current state in Saudi Arabia combines the worst of disasters; it strips citizens of their fundamental rights while demanding absolute loyalty. He believes that this equation has eliminated any possibility of reforming the social contract and that the Shia suffer doubly under this formula, as they are treated as inherently disloyal and are required to provide additional evidence of loyalty—not to the state, but to the ruler. Alaoudh emphasizes that the solution lies in a state based on citizenship.
Similarly, Saudi writer Mohammad Al-Mahfouz argues that mending sectarian relations in the Gulf “depends on political reform and establishing a state governed by law and constitution, where the political system genuinely represents all parties and social groups. The state must be for everyone, without excluding any group or expression.” This necessitates political, cultural, and social reforms to prevent historical or modern sectarian differences from becoming barriers that hinder the formation of a united Gulf bloc working toward reform. Al-Mahfouz stresses the importance of highlighting values that prevent rights violations and argues that sectarian differences do not justify any party’s infringement on the rights of others.
Bahraini human rights activist Sayed Yousif Al-Muhafda shares similar views, highlighting a complete absence of the concept of citizenship in Bahrain. He acknowledges the urgent need for a new social contract between the ruling family and the majority of citizens, describing the current relationship as tense. He stresses that there is a deliberate exclusion of citizens from participating in decision-making and public policy formulation.
He adds: “The relationship between the ruling family and citizens in Bahrain is like that between a tribe and its allies and supporters, favoring certain tribes while marginalizing others, privileging some social classes while discriminating against others, and practicing sectarian discrimination against Shia as seventh-class citizens.” Al-Muhafda does not deny the existence of Sunni opposition facing persecution but believes that the share of repression against Shia is greater. He attributes the overall repression of citizens in Bahrain to the absence of concepts of citizenship.
He explains that some Western powers, allied with Bahrain on political, economic, and military issues, turn a blind eye to human rights violations in the country and ensure there is no international accountability. He concludes: “Bahrain boasts of being a state that tolerates minorities, which we, as human rights activists, commend and support. But the question remains: What about the majority? Why does the king not show tolerance towards the Shia majority and protect their rights and religious freedoms?”
Politicization of Sectarianism
Despite the deep-rooted Shia presence in the region and their long history of peaceful coexistence within their communities, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 triggered transformations that fueled sectarian conflicts in the region. This shifted the nature of the relationship between Iran and its neighbors from an ideological or pragmatic disagreement to one based on exporting the Islamic revolution. This situation led various parties to exploit the Shia condition in some countries, further deepening the sectarian crisis in the region.
Over the past decades, the Arab region has witnessed severe political conflicts, which at times escalated into devastating civil wars due to doctrinal differences between Sunnis and Shia. This was starkly evident in Iraq, where sectarian wars led to real humanitarian catastrophes, including killings, assassinations, and displacements. According to some countries where these conflicts occurred, Iranian interventions were not far removed from these disasters. This cannot be separated from the events and consequences of the First Gulf War between Iraq and Iran, during which Iraq received significant Gulf support as it was considered to be fighting the Shia in a Sunni region.
The war known as “Operation Decisive Storm” serves as an example of the politicization of sectarian issues to achieve political gains. This war began in 2015 with a coalition led by Saudi Arabia and its allies against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels who had seized control of the Yemeni capital, Sanaa. Although the Arab coalition justified its intervention as supporting Yemeni legitimacy, the war exacerbated sectarian conflicts among Yemenis, leading to a real humanitarian catastrophe.
Politics plays a role in fueling sectarianism, with some ruling regimes viewing their citizens as tools in an external political project, deepening the crisis of the Shia in Gulf countries, where democracy, human rights, citizenship, and freedoms are scarce.
One of the most prominent instances where the Sunni-Shia conflict was politicized and exploited was during the Arab Spring protests in Bahrain. The protesters demanded legitimate political rights and freedoms, but the issue was turned into a sectarian conflict, raising fears for the unity and security of the state. The security apparatus exploited these fears to suppress the uprising violently, leading to severe human rights violations.
Harith Hasan, a political researcher at the Carnegie Middle East Centre , sees no inherent problem in sectarian differences. He told Muwatin, “All religions, doctrines, and ideologies gradually branch out into multiple, competing sects and currents, but the problem lies in politicizing these differences, turning them into socio-political identities, and then mobilizing people around them in a conflictual framework of ‘us versus them.’ This process, called ‘sectarianization,’ converts sectarian identities into political identities and, in a conflictual context, into armed identities that legitimize killing the other. Ultimately, what is needed is not to abandon sectarian differences but to avoid politicizing them, accepting the space for difference, and removing the conflictual nature from it.”
Saudi writer Mohammad Al-Mahfouz confirms this view, stating that today’s sectarian incitement is not innocent but rather part of a political agenda. He explains that sectarian incitement will not eliminate Sunnis or Shia from the region but will fuel reasons for warfare and hatred. When these deepen, we all face a real danger to the security and stability of the entire region.
He attributes sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shia to current political, economic, and social factors. He believes the first step in addressing this issue is to build equal citizenship in rights and duties while shielding Arab Shia from any negative effects of the Arab-Iranian conflict or competition.
Meanwhile, Bahraini human rights advocate Sayed Yousif Al-Muhafda argues that the “divide and rule” mentality is a strategy for maintaining power, where stirring and reinforcing sectarian strife is a means to divert attention from citizens’ demands for civil rights. He believes the solution lies in a new social contract that regulates the relationship between citizens and the government in a democratic system with a parliament that possesses effective oversight mechanisms and strong civil society institutions ensuring social justice.
Although the situation for Shia in Kuwait is relatively calm, it is not entirely free from occasional tensions for various reasons, such as election campaigns or online altercations on social media platforms. The Ministry of Interior has warned it will confront any attempts to incite sectarian or tribal strife in the country. In 2015, the bombing of the Imam Sadiq Mosque, frequented by Shia Muslims, was a terrorist incident for which the Islamic State claimed responsibility, raising several concerns about the status and safety of Shia and overall social security in Kuwait.
Kuwaiti writer and academic Dr. Salwa Saeed attributes the few cases of sectarian polarization to regional conditions, conflicts, and sometimes political sectarian polarization, citing the period of the Iran-Iraq war as an example. “This is not related to the Shia sect but to politics,” she says.
She believes Kuwait enjoys stability in this regard due to the considerable rights afforded to Kuwaiti Shia: “There is no distinction between Sunnis and Shia in terms of rights and duties, meaning that the Shia community is present in all the most important state institutions. Therefore, there is no sectarian polarization like in other Gulf countries. If it does occur, it is due to external provocations and attempts to tamper with the internal situation.”
In conclusion, Shia Muslims remain an integral part of Gulf societies, but shared history, language, and religion have not been enough to ensure peace and stability. Despite variations in the situations of Shia across different countries, there is an evident, widespread suffering experienced by Shia in the Gulf region, including deprivation of civil and political rights and sectarian discrimination. This suffering is not limited to being a minority in some areas; Shia also face oppression even as a majority in their communities under a ruling minority, as is the case in Bahrain.
Politics undoubtedly plays a role in sectarianism, with some ruling regimes viewing their citizens as tools in a hostile political project from abroad, exacerbating the Shia crisis in Gulf countries that lack much democracy, human rights, citizenship, and freedoms. As a result, the persistence of bad faith in handling Shia issues only aggravates the problem.
